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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

LOWELL POTIER,

Plaintiff

vs.

Case No.
120359

UTAH~DRIVE~UR~SELF SYSTEM,
INC., a corporation of Utah,
and V. H. ANDERSON,

Defendants

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff Potter on February 2nd, 1959 rented from
Defendants an automobile; Plaintiff testified he was a
customer of Defendant and that he had rented automo~
biles from Defendant on a number of occasions over a
period of five years (Trans. 29). Receipts were offered
and received showing Plaintiff's rental of cars from De~
fendant on July 12, 1957 and September 12, 1957 (Exhs.
1 and 2). Among other things Plaintiff g.ave his address

1
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as 256 Union Avenue in Midvale, an address where he
had lived for many years, and now resides. Plaintiff still
receives mail at that address and received mail from the
State Tax Commission post marked December 28, 1959
See Exhibit 6 (Line 38), although Plaintiff testified that
recently there had been a renumbering of the houses and
his house number now is 297 7700 South, Midvale (Tr.
38).
When Plaintiff returned with the car 8 days later
(Tr. 34) Defendant Anderson refused to take the money
for the rental of the car and instead informed Plaintiff
he was under arrest.
Plaintiff waited until an arresting officer arrived and
took him into custody. He testified that he was held at
the City Jail and later at the Couny Jail for a total of
eight hours. Plaintiff was fingerprinted, photographed,
booked and placed in jail (Tr. 35).
Later Plaintiff appeared at a preliminary hearing where
after evidence was offered by the State, the com·plaint for
embezzlement was dismissed.
Plaintiff thereafter commenced an action for malicious
prosecution. At the trial Plaintiff testified he paid $300.00
to his attorney to defend the criminal action and $50.00
for a bond.
The jury returned a verdict of $5,000.00 general dam..
ages; $350.00 special damages, making a total of
$5,350.00. It is from the judgment on this verdict that
Defendants appeal.
Plaintiff's wife, Marie Potter, testified that she had
lived at 256 Union Avenue for twenty years; that she had
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lived at that address before she married Mr. Potter. (Tr.
48) and that she and her husband and family are well
known in the area; that she does church work. She testi~
fied that during most of the time the car Plainiff had
rented was parked at the mouth of the driveway; that it
was never in the garage, but in the front part of he drive~
way (Tr. 49). She testified that except for trips to a doc~
tor's office, the car remained at this point.
Mr. Miner, the deputy county attorney, who prose~
cuted the action in behalf of the State of Utah, testified
as follows (Tr. 57):

Q. At the present time you hold public office?
A. I am the Deputy Criminal Attorney for Salt
Lake County.

Q. And were you so engaged in February,
1959?
A. I was.

Q. Calling your atte·ntion to on or about the
9th of February, 1959 did you have occasion to
have a Mr. V. H. Anderson in your office?
A. I did.

Q. And what did he come in for?
A. Mr. Anderson and one of the officers of
the Salt Lake City Police Department who is head
of the auto~theft~ they came together into my of~
fice to request a complaint against a Mr. Lowell
Potter for embezzling an automobile.

Q. Now did they see you more than once?
A. Oh, yes.

Q. How many times did they see you?
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A. They came on the 6th of February, 1959.
And again on the 9th.

Q. And again on the 9th?
A. Yes.
Q. Now what did you say to him on the 6th,
Mr. Miner?
A. On the 6th they presented to me a contract
signed by Mr. Lowell Potter, in which he agreed,
rented a car, and agreed to return it on the 2nd
and I told them that in my opinion sufficient time
had not elapsed to warrant a criminal complaint
at that time because I didn't think there was
enough time to show criminal intent, unless the
car had been found stripped same place or outside
of the county or outside of the state.
Q. Now did you have any conversation rela. .
tive to the address and the location that he had
given?
A. Yes. We discussed the facts of the matter,
and, if I recall correctly, they told me, I think it
was the officer that told me, that they could find
no such house or no such address as 256 Union
Avenue, and that they were of the opinion that
this was a phoney adress and a phoney street. So
I instructed them to go out and make a diligent
search in the area to see if they could find this
house, or this address, or this car, and I told them
i'f they could find the car or the address to come
back at some later date and we would talk to them
again concerning a criminal complaint.

Q. Now was that on the 6th?
A. That was on the 6th.

Q. Now did you see them again on the 9th?
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A. Yes.
Q. And did they say they had made a search
for 256 Union Avenue?
A. If I remember correctly I talked to the offi. .
cer and he said he had made a very diligent search
in the area of 256 Union Avenue in Midvale; that
he could find no such house or no such address
or no such automobile in that area.
Q. Now was Mr. Anderson present with him
at the time?
A. Yes. Mr. Anderson was present at the time.
It is apparent from the testimony that the address of
Potter and the location of the car could be accomplished
with little or no effort on the part of Defendants, it is
further apparent from the testimony that these facts were
not disclosed to the County Attorney.
ARGUMENT
POINT I AND II
IN ANSWER TO POINT I AND II THE DEFEND. .
ANTS DID NOT MAKE A COMPLETE DISCLOSURE
OF ALL THE FACTS KNOWN TO THEM; THAT
THE ADDRESS OF PLAINTIFF AND THE LOCA. .
TION OF THE CAR COULD HAVE BEEN EASILY
ASCERTAINED BY ANY REASONABLE DEGREE
OF DILIGENCE:
In the deposition of Lowell Potter, taken on May 28,
1959, eight months before the trial, Potter testified that
he lived at 256 Union Avenue, and that was his perma. .
nent address. Mrs. Potter, as hereinabove set forth, testi. .
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fied as to the address and her acquaintance in the neigh. .
borhood.
Based upon the testimony of Mr. Miner that he in. .
structed Mr. Anderson to make a "diligent" search to
locate 256 Union Avenue, together with the testimony
of Mrs. Pater that she lived at this address for many years
and prior to her marriage, that she and her husband were
all known in the community and area, we submit that the
question of whether Defendants 'had made a full, fair
and complete disclosure to the prosecutor, becomes one
of fact for the jury.
In Uhr vs. Eaton, 95 Utah, 309, relied on so much
by Defendant's counsel ,the Court said at page 316.
"Turning now to the question as to whether
a sufficient showing of lack of probable cause was
made so as to require the submission of this issue
to a jury, we are confronted with a rule of law that
it is the duty of a complainant to make a full,
fair and complete disclosure of the facts within
his knowledge to the public prosecutor, and also
all the facts which he had reasonable ground to
believe existed at the time of making the statement,
or all facts which he could have ascertained by
reasonable diligence, and that, having done so, he
can successfully defend, by reason of such disclos. .
ure and the acting on the advice received thereon,
any malicious prosecution action brought against
him.
"Respondent maintains that because the rec. .
ord affirmatively shows, which it does, that she
testified substantially to the same facts at the pre. .
liminary hearing as she had theretofore told the
county attorney prior to the issuance of the crimi. .
nal complaint, that she must be classified as having
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made a full, fair and truthful disclosure in accord . .
ance with the rule, and therefore justly entitled to
the directed verdict rendered. In the light of other
facts in the record, however, taken in their most
favorably light, which we are required to do in
determining this question, we cannot say that re. .
spondent is entitled to the protective cloak of this
rule.
Appellant contends that the respondent made
up the story which she told the County Attorney
and on which she relied for the conviction, and
that such statements were false. Can it be said that
one who concocts or "frames" another by going
to the county attorney relating false statements,
which appear plausible enough at the time, and
thereby obtains the arrest of an innocent man, can
thereafter successfully prevent a malicious prose...
cution action from being submitted to a Jury by
merely showing that her testimony at the prelimi. .
nary hearing before a magistrate was substantially
the same as related by her originally to the public
prosecutor in the face of facts which tend to show
that the whole story was untrue? We think not.
The very essence of the rule is that the disclosure
to the· prosecutor must be truthful, and when evi. .
dence is introduced in a damage action, as here,
by the aggrieved ·party tending to show that the
county attorney unbeknowingly acted on deliber. .
ate falsehoods, presented by the complainant, then
this rule should not he used to prevent the triers
of fact from passing on the ultimate issues.
We accordingly hold, on the record before us,
that there appears such a substantial conflict of
evidence regarding the necessary elements of prob . .
able cause as to require the submission of this issue
to a jury. In doing so, however, we do not relax
the time. .honored rule that a truthful and full dis. .
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closure of the facts to a prosecutor constitutes a
complete defense to an action of this kind.
We feel that there was a sufficient showing of
malice to require submission to a jury. In certain
cases the facts from which lack of probable cause
may be inferred may also give rise to the inference
of malice. Ward v. United Groc. Co. 84 Utah 437,
36 P. 2d 99. But there appears affirmatively here
independent acts and words on the ·part of re. .
spondent, which, if given credence, tend to sub . .
stantiate appellant's theory. The statement of one
witness that respondent told him before any arrest. .
ing officer arrived hat appellant would never work
for the company again, and also, that Mrs. Eaton
had made statements about the plaintiff indicating
ill will toward him; respondent's statement that
if the witness would say that he saw appellant
throw a package in 'her yard, he would make a
good witness for her, and finally, the statement
of respondent in reply to a suggestion that she tell
Uhr that she saw him throw the bacon in the yard,
"no, no, I would be afraid to. He is a dangerous
snooping character," would appear to be sufficient,
under all the facts and circumstances to justify
-the submission of the question of malice to the Jury.
In Sweatman vs. Linton, 66 Utah 208, 241 P. 309, The
Plaintiff had been charged with issuing a check against
insufficient funds. After the complaint had been dismissed
he brought his action for malicious prosecution, Page 217,
the Court:
"Under that state of facts, it was a question
for the Jury to determine whether Linton in good
faith believed that there was cause for the prose. .
cution of Plaintiff for a violation of the statute
quoted.¥-~¥-
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"It must appear, however, without contradic. .
tion, that a full and accurate statement of all the
facts was made to the attorney before the advice
was given, and that the party causing the prosecu. .
tion was advised that he had probable cause to
initiate the prosecution and that in good faith
did believe there was probable cause.~~~ From all
the facts appearing in this record, we are of the
opinion that the question as to whether Linton
in good faith believed that there was probable cause
for the prosecution of Plaintiff, or whether he acted
maliciously in causing the prosecution of Plaintiff,
was for the jury."
Again in Thomas vs. F11ost 83 Utah, 207, 27 P 2d 459,
the Court held at p. 215:
"The important question the Court and Jury
had to consider was whether or not the defendant,
in causing a complaint to be issued charging plain. .
tiff with perjury, acted maliciously and without
probable cause. Both must concur in order that
the defendant be held liable. Kennedy v. Burbidge
54 Utah 497, 183 P. 325, 4 ALR 1682 Singh vs.
MacDonald, 55 Utah 541, 188 P. 631.
"It is the further contention of counsel that the
appellant made a full and complete statement of
the facts to the county attorney, and that thereon
the county attorney made an independent investiga. .
tion and as a result of such investigation reached
the conclusion that the respondent had committed
perjury and that this under the law absolves the
appellant from any liability to respondent, even
though it appears that the committing magistrate
found that here was no probable cause for the in . .
stitution of the proceeding. But the weakness of
these contentions, as applied to this cause, is in
ignoring the facts that the principal issue at the
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trial was whether appellant made a full and truth..
ful disclosure to the county atorney of all the facts
known to him. There was competent testimony
offered by the respondent, which if believed by the
jury, conclusively proved that the appellant did
not make a truthful statement of the facts to the
couny attorney, but, on the conrary, mislead the
county attorney. We refer to the testimony of the
witness Paskett, who testified that Thomas did not
sign the affidavit, but that Frost had brought the
affidavit to him arid asked him to sign Thomas'
name to it. The jury had a right to believe the testi.mony of Paskett and the verdict shows it believed
him. The testimony of Paskett was sharply con..
tradicted by the appellant and his son, and there
was opinion evidence given by handwriting ex. .
perts that the hand that signed Thomas' name to
the affidavit was Thomas' own, and other evidence
which would have justified the jury in entirely ig.noring the testimony of Paskett. Where the truth
lay was a question the jury was obliged to decide,
and it found that the truth was with Paskett and
not with the appellant."
The rule is well established that it is the duty of com.plainant to make a full, fair and complete disclosure of the
facts within his knowledge, and also all facts which he
had reasonable ground to believe existed at the time of
making the statement, or all facts which he could have
ascertained by reasonable diligence.

38 C.]. 434.
This rule of law was given to the jury by the Court
in this action by the 7th instructions {Trs. 117) as fol.lows:

INSTRUCTION NO. 7
"You are further instructed that the De. .
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fendants are required to make and to prove to your
satisfaction by a preponderance of testimony that
they did make, to the County Attorney of Salt
Lake County, a full fair and true statement of the
material facts known to him of which he had and
knew the means of ascertaining and if the Defend. .
ants before instituting criminal proceedings, ob . .
tained advise of the County Attorney and at the
time of obtaining such advice communicated to the
counsel or County Attorney all the facts bearing
on the case of which they had knowledge or could
have ascertained by reasonable diligence and in. .
quiry, and that they acted upon the advice given
them honestly and in good faith, the absence of
malice is established, the want of probable cause
is negatived, and the action for malicious prosecu. .
tion will not lie.''
In Schnathorst vs. Williams, Iowa (1949) 36 NW 2nd
739 . . 10 ALR 2nd 1199 at page 1211, the Court:
"Defendant testified that he honestly believed,
when he signed and swore to the information, that
Plaintiff had stolen the car. Such testimony was
proper and competent, but it is not conclusive. The
important question was not his belief, but whether
all of the facts, as he knew them or should have
known them, were such as to justify the ordinary,
reasonably prudent, careful and conscientious per. .
son in reaching such a conclusion. A like conten. .
tion was made in Shaul v. Brown, 28 Iowa 3 7, 46,
4 Am. Rep. 151, and this Court said: 'This cannot
be the law. No man's liberties or rights can thus
be measured by even the honest belief of another.
The honest belief of a person commencing a crimi. .
nal prosecution against another, in the guilt of
the accused is an essential element of fact for him
in showing probable cause or in disproving the
want of it; but he must also show due reasonable
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ground for suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cau..
tious man in that belief, before his belief can be..
come his vindication or shield. If he should show
such circumstances, and yet it was apparent that
he did not himself believe in the guilt of the ac..
cused, they would not protect him."
Defendant leans heavily on the defense that
he stated his case fully and fairly to the county
attorney and relied upon the latter's advice in start. .
ing and pursuing the criminal prosecution. The
fact that defendant took such counsel before acting
is. not an absolute or conclusive defense. It may
or may not rebut malice and want of good cause.
To be a good defense the advise of counsel must
have been sought in good faith, from honest mo. .
tives, and for good purposes, after a full and fair
disclosure of all matters having a bearing on the
case, and the advice must have been followed in
good faith with honest belief in the probable guilt
of the one suspected. As said in Johnson vs. Miller,
82 Iowa 693, 47 NW 903, 904, 48 NW 1081, 31
Am. St. Rep. 514, "it is good faith that excuses
from wrongfully commencing or continuing the
criminal prosecution". Advice of counsel does not
necessarily shield a person against a charge of rna. .
licious prosecution.
Mesher v. Iddings, 72 Iowa 553, 554, 34 NW
328.
"If, however, the defendant misrepresents the
facts to counsel; if he does not act in good faith
under the advice received; if he does not himself
believe that there is cause for the prosecution of
action ... and acts in bad faith in originating and
urging the prosecution; he will not be protected,
and in such cases the integrity or bona fides of his
conduct is a question of fact for the jury."
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Center v. Spring, 2 Iowa
In Bair v. Schultz, supra, 227 Iowa 193, 201,
288 NW 119, 123, we quoted from Wilson v.
Thurlow, 156 Iowa 656, 658, 137 NW 956, as
follows:
"Whether defendant in good faith acted on the
advice of the County Attorney is generally a ques . .
tion for the jury. \Xlhite v. International Text. .
Book Co. 144 Iowa 92, 121 NW 1104. Advice of
an attorney to constitute a good defense must be
based on a full and fair statement of the facts with. .
in defendant's knowledge, and the advice must have
been acted on in good faith and with the belief that
there was good cause for the prosecution, and
whether or not these were done is a jury question.
(Citing decisions.) "In Dickson v. Young, supra,
208 Iowa 1, 6, 221 NW 820, 822, the court said:
"Ordinarily, the question as to whether such dis...
closures were made in good faith, and the advice
of an attorney obtained, are questions of fact to
be submitted to the Jury".
On this question in Wilson v. Lapham, supra,
196 Iowa 745, 750, 195 NW 235, 237, we said:
"Obviously, this is ordinarily a question of fact
for the jury."
Advice of counsel cannot be used as a subter. .
fuge. As said by the eminent Chief Justice Shaw
in, Wills v. Noyes, 12 Pick, Mass. 324, 327, 328;
"But even legal advice, if used only as a cover, and
not acted upon in good faith - if it does not in. .
duce an honest belief that the party has probable
cause, will not screen him from the consequences
of prosecuting an entirely groundless suit." The
Maryland Court in Turner v. Walker, 3 Gil & J
377, 22 Am. Dec. 329, 334, said "But in an action
for a malicious prosecution, . . . it is not enough,
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as has been supposed, for the defendant merely to
show that he acted under professional advice, the
want of probable cause having first been estab. .
lished. He may 'have done that, and believed that
he acted legally, and yet have acted maliciously and
for the purpose of oppression. And having acted
maliciously and oppressively and without reason. .
able or probable cause, his belief alone, that he
acted legally will not support him in his malicious
and oppressive violation of the law. However far
his taking professional advice should go, if standing
alone, to show his absence of malice, and a desire
to act legally and correctly; yet it is evidence only
to go to the jury for that purpose, and may be re. .
buted by other surrounding circumstances the
whole of which should go to the jury."
POINT III
IN ANSWER TO POINT III OF APPELLANTS'
BRIEF, DEFENDANT HAD THE BURDEN OF
PROOF THAT HE HAD MADE A FULL, AND COM. .
PLETE DISCLOSURE OF ALL THE MATERIAL
FACTS TO THE COUNTY ATIORNEY, WHO ON
HIS OWN VOLITION ADVISED THE ISSUANCE
OF A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, AND DEFENDANT
FAILED TO SUSTAIN THAT BURDEN.
10 ALR 2nd 1272, #20 BURDEN OF PROOF.
''The defense of advice of counsel is an affirma. .
tive one, the burden of esablishing which rests
upon the defendant in a maliciou~ prosecution
action. See Diggs v. Arnold Bros. ( 1033) 132 Cal.
App. 518, 23 P. 2d 71, wherein apparently the
district attorney, as well as private attorneys, was
consulted.
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The defendant in a malicious prosecution ac~
tion has the burden of proving that the advice of
private counsel and commonwealth's attorney was
sought and obtained with the honest purpose of
being informed as to the law and upon a full, cor~
rect and honest disclosure of all the material facts
within his knowledge, or which should have been
within his knowledge if 'he had made a reasonably
careful investigation. Commander v. Provident Re. .
lief Asso. ( 1920) 126 Va. 455, 102 SE 89.
In Alb'Yiecht v. Ward (1900) 91 Ill. App. 38,
it was held that the defense of advice of the state's
attorney given after a full and fair disclosure of
material facts, and acted upon in good faith was
an affirmative one required to be sustained by a
preponderance of the evidence.
In Shaffer vs. Arnaelsteen ( 1921 54 Cal. App.
719, 202 P 946, considered further, supra 4, it
was held that to support the affirmative defense
of advice of counsel the defendant in a malicious
prosecution action must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that he made to the deputy prose~
cuting attorney, a full, fair and true statement of
all the material facts, "known to him, of which he
had and knew the means of ascertaining."
And in Beadle v. Harrison ( 1920), 58 Mont.
606, 194 P. 134, the Court pointed out that where
a prima facie case was made out by the plaintiff
in a malicious ·prosecution action, the defendant
must rebut if by showing the existence of probable
cause, which 'he could do by the affirmative defense
that he fully and fairly and in good faith disclosed
all of the facts to the county atorney."
That a defendant in a malicious prosecution
action made a full and complete disclosure of all
the facts to an attorney who advised a prosecution
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is in the nature of an affirmative defense, the bur. .
den of proving which is on the defendant, see Low. .
ther vs. Metzker ( 1949) - Idaho - 203 P 2d 604.
Ag.ain, in Scsnathorst v. Williams (1949) Iowa
- 36 NW 2d 739, 10 ALR 2d 1199 (Supra)
where defendant in a malicious prosecution action
pleaded specially and affirmatively the defense of
advice of the county attorney, it was held that the
burden was on the defendant to establish good faith
in seeking and acting upon the advice of the coun. .
ty attorney.
This principle was reaffirmed in the recent (1956)
case of Cottrell vs. Grand Union Tea Company, 5 Utah
2nd, 187, 299 P. 2nd 622; Our Court held
"That defendants made full disclosure of facts
to prosecuting attorney who advised filing of com. .
plaint is defense to action for malicious prosecution
but it is an affirmative defense, the burden resting
u·pon defendants to establish it by preponderance
of evidence."
Mr. Justice Crockett:
"From the foregoing facts, one does not wonder
that the jury was not convinced that Mr. Taylor
was given to understand the method of operation
between parties. This should have been made clear
to him by Mr. Fives and Mr. Pope who were seek. .
ing the prosecution. They were businessmen who
either were, or should have· been, entirely familiar
with the facts and circumstances, and should have
been acting with caution and circumspection in
regard to a matter so serious as charging the plain. .
tiff with a felony. From the dealings of these parties
as disclosed by the evidence the conclusion is not
at all unreasonable that the company was simply
using the pressure of potential criminal prosecu. .
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tion to enforce its demands against Mr. Cottrell,
which is expressly denounced by our statute. Stickle
v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., Utah, 251 P. 2d, 867,
871 Newton vs. Oregon Short LineR. R. 43 Utah,
219, 134 P. 567.
This case having been tried to a jury, they were the
exclusive judges of the evidence and of the inferences
to be drawn therefrom. It was not the privilege of the
court to disagree with and overrule their action unless
the evidence so unerringly pointed to a contrary conclu. .
sion that there existed no reasonable basis for the jury's
finding. This court has many times affirmed commitment
to a policy of reluctance to interfere with findings of fact
and verdicts rendered by juries and has declared that it
should be done only when the matter is so clear as to be
free from doubt.
In Butz v. Union Pacific R. R. 120 Utah, 85, 232 P.
332, we quoted with approval the language of Justice
Murphy, speaking for the United States Supreme Court
with respect to trial by jury: "~~~A right so fundamental
and sacred to the citizen, whether guaranteed by the· Con. .
stitution or provided by statute, should be jealously
guarded by the courts." Again in Sticle v. Union Pac. R. R.
we stated"~~~ we remain cognizant of the vital importance
of the privilege of trial by jury in our system of justice and
deem it our duty to zealously protect and preserve it. ~~:t
Upon the basis of the self. .interest of the defendant's wit. .
nesses and the uncertainties and other unsatisfactory aspects
of their evidence, hereinabove discussed, there is ample basis
upon which the jury, acting fairly and reasonably, could re. .
fuse to believe and find that there had been a full, fair and
truthful disclosure of all the material facts to Mr. Taylor.
Therefore, the trial court should not have in effect over. .
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ruled their determination and substituted his own con. .
elusion that such disclosure had been established as a mat. .
ter of law.
The case is remanded with instructions to reinstate
verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff and to enter
judgment thereon."
POINT IV
DEFENDANTS ANSWER PLAINTIFF'S POINT
IV THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF
MALICE AND WANT OF PROBABLE CAUSE, TO
GO TO THE JURY.
THE COURT INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS
FOLLOWS: (Tr. 115)
INSTRUCTION NO. 5
"You may infer malice from the absence of any
reasonable or probable cause justifying Defendants'
acts. In other words if you find from the evidence
that Defendants acted without any reasonable, jus. .
tifiable or probable cause in charging Plaintiff with
the felony resulting in his arrest, publicity and em. .
barrassment, you may infer malice from such con. .
duct."

5 ALR 1688" The failure of a person who has
received information tending to show the commis. .
sian of a crime to make further inquiry or investi. .
gation as an ordinarily prudent man would have
made under the circumstances before instituting a
prosecution renders him liable for want of probable
cause. (cases therein cited) ~¥-~ (p. 1691). A fail . .
ure to make an investigation before instituting pro. .
ceedings constitutes a want of probable cause when
the information received is such as to put an ordin. .
arily prudent and caution person on injuiry. Dun . .
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lay v. New Zealand F. & M. Ins.

C~o.

(1895, 109
Cal. 365, 42 Pac. 29; Coyle vs. Scnellenberg (1906)
30 Pa. Supra Ct. 246.
~~~when

the facts are easily obtainable, a
failure to make an inquiry before instituting a
prosecution constitutes a want of probable cause.
Lacy v. Mitchell ( 1864) 23 Ind. 67; Lawrence vs.
Leathers ( 1903) 31 Ind. App. 414, 68 N.E. 179;
Boyd v. Mendenhall (1893 53 Minn. 274,55 N. W.
45; Sweet v. Smith ( 1899) 42 App. Div. 502, 59
N. T. Supp. 404. And see the cases cited supra
in II. a.
In Lacy v. Mitchell (Ind.) supra, it appeared
that the daughter of a landlord saw the tenant
feed his chickens with some shelled com. Both
the tenant and the landlord kept shelled corn in
the same barn.
The daughter also thought that her father's pile
of com looked as if a bushel had been taken there-from. The landlord thereupon prosecuted the ten-ant. The court held that; as the landlord could
easily have learned the truth by speaking with the
tenant, there was a want of probable cause. The
Court said: "Probable cause may be defined to be
that apparent state of facts found to exist under
reasonable inquiry; that is, such inquiry as the
given case rendered convenient and proper, which
would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent
man to believe the accused person had committed,
in a criminal case, the crime charged; and in a civil
case, that a cause of action existed . . . We do not
think probable cause for the prosecution was
shown, considering all the circumstances. Lacy
could have easily learned the facts of the case by
speaking with Mitchell who was near him.
He should have made more inquiry, under the
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circumstances of this case. If he really believea
that Mitchell had stolen his corn, the belief arose
from his own negligence.
Again in Kennedy vs. Burbidge, 54 Utah 497, 183 P.
325 at p. 506 this Court stated this rule as follows: Thur. .
man J.
"We are not disposed to hold that a prosecutor
acts without probable cause merely because it turns
out that the information upon which he acts was
false. But where, in addition to this fact, it is shown
that the prosecutor either knew that the informa. .
tion upon which he aced was false, or had no per. .
sonal knowledge of its truth, and made no investi. .
tion to determine its accuracy before instituting
the prosecution a different question is presented.
A judgment obtained under either of said condi. .
tions should have no standing in a court of justice
as evidence of probable cause, much less be treated
as conclusive. While every reasonable allowance
should be made for possible errors and mistakes,
we know of no reason why in a case of this kind
a judgment wrongfully or recklessly procured
should be used as evidence by the wrongdoer to
defeat the person injured in his efforts to obtain
redress."
Again in the case of Schnathorst v. Williams, Ia. 10 ALR 2d 1199 from which we have heretofore quoted
above, the Court held that the ''malice which is an in. .
gredient of a cause of action for malicious prosecution is
not ill will, hatred or express malice, but a want of prob . .
able cause.
The Court at p. 1210 "There was no burden
on plaintiff to show "ill will," "hatred," or "ex. .
press malice" on the part of the defendant. Malice
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may be shown from want of probable cause, or
froma prima facie showing thereof. As said, by
quotation ,i nConnelly v. White, 122 Iowa 391,
393, 9 BNW 144, 145: "Malice in law is where
malice is established by legal presumption from
proof of certain facts . . . Malice in fact is to be
found by the jury from the evidence in the case.
They may infer it from want of probable cause.
But it is well established that the plaintiff is not
required to prove express malice, in the pOpular
signification of the term, as that defendant was
prompted by malevolence, or acted from motives of
ill will, resentment, or hatred toward the plain~
tiff It issufficient if he prove it in its enlarged legal
sense. ~~~ ''The fact that the action was com~
menced and prosecuted without probable cause
may be considered by the jury on the question of
malice . . . The malice required to support the ac~
tion may be inferred by the jury from want of
probable cause."
CONCLUSION
We submit that Plaintiff is entitled to have the judg~
ment of the District Court affirmed. Had Defendants
made any reasonable search for the car at the address or
in the general neighborhood of Midvale, undoubtedly, the
car would have been located, there would have been no
arrest, and this lawsuit would not have been filed. It was
the lack of any diligence on the part of Defendants which
caused the issuance of the complaint, although Defend~
ants would like to shift the blame to the County Attorney.
Potter was known to Defendant and as we have pointed
out had done business with them on a number of previous
occasions.
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It would have been a comparatively simple matter for
Defendants to locate the Plaintiff and the car had they
exercised any d~gree of diligence.
We therefore feel that the verdict and judgment were
fair and equitable and should be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted

LaMAR DUNCAN,
Attorney for Respondent
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